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This paper examines how the private sector responds to export opportunities induced by FTAs, 
using evidence from the Thai manufacturing sector during the period 2003-08. The core 
methodology is to undertake an inter-product panel-data econometric analysis to gain a better 
understanding of FTA utilization across products. Different from previous studies, it makes an 
explicit distinction between actual and preferential trade in which the latter is measured by the 
administrative records of FTA implementation. Our findings suggest that the product coverage 
is limited. Products that have benefited from FTA tariff preferences so far are highly 
concentrated. Our key finding from the econometric analysis is that as rules of origin (ROO) 
constraints are binding empirically, the ability to comply with ROO as well as tariff margin 
does matter in firms’ decisions to use FTAs. The estimated cost in compiling ROO is equivalent 
to a tariff in the range of 2% to 10%. Besides, the FTA impact on exports is conditioned by 
trade volume during the pre-signing FTA period. The key policy inference is that it is unlikely 
to be able to promote exports by maximizing the number of FTAs, while ignoring the nature of 
FTA partners. The nature of the FTA partner does matter in establishing whether the signed FTA 
would be useful. In addition, for Japan and countries which are enthusiastic about FTAs as a 
mode for further liberalization, FTA negotiation on tariff cuts schedules must be undertaken in a 
more comprehensive way in which ROO and trade facilitation issues must be incorporated in 
the negotiation. 
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1. Issues 
 
The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has been one of the most 
notable phenomena in the world economy over the past 15 years. FTAs have become the 
dominant form of international cooperation on trade policy for virtually all members of 
the WTO, with the exception of Mongolia.  The number of FTAs notified to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) tripled from around 124 in 1994 to 370 by August 2008, 
more than half of which are currently in force.
1  Interestingly, half of them are in the Asia 
and Pacific region, the center of global trade dynamism, and engender far-reaching 
implications, not only for the philosophy and operation of the multilateral trading system, 
but also for the day-to-day conduct of cross-border trade. 
 
In general, FTAs usually involve liberalising trade among the member countries. 
However, their actual impact on trade is not as straightforward as we usually expect from 
multilateral and/or unilateral liberalization. Indeed, an FTA deal could well be considered 
‘preferential’, meaning it will discriminate against nonmember countries, depending on 
the rules of origins (ROOs) the rules to prove the origin of good for the purpose of 
determining eligibility for tariff concessions. Whether ROO are used as a vital 
commercial policy instruments depends on how they are designed and implemented.
2  
Therefore, export opportunities created by a given FTA (henceforth referred to FTA 
export creation) are essentially an empirical issue.   
 
So far there has not been any systematic analysis of the trade-flow effects of 
FTAs because of the limited access to administrative records of FTA implementation.  
Two approaches are used to examine the FTA effects on trade.  The first approach is to 
estimate
 a gravity model with a binary dummy variable to distinguish FTA member 
                                                 
1Further details are available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/ 
regfac_e.htm#top.  
 
2 There are a number of studies arguing that ROO have been used as vital commercial 
policy instruments to mould ROOs to the benefit of especial interest groups (Vermulst & Waer 
1990, Krueger 1999, Bhagwati et al. 1999, Falvey & Reed  2002, Estevadeordal & Suominen 
2004, James 2005, and Krishna 2005).   3
countries from non-members (e.g. Magee, 2003, 2008; Soloaga &Winters, 2001; 
Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1995; Athukorala & Yamashita; 2006).
3 This approach ignores 
the ‘conditioning effects’’ of ROOs by implicitly assuming that tariff concessions offered 
by FTAs are readily available to the exporters.  In other words, this approach does not 
make a distinction between actual and preferential trade where the latter reflects 
transactions recorded in administrative records of FTA implementation.  Such an 
assumption is rather restrictive.
 4  The few available studies of the actual utilization of 
FTA concessions suggest that the actual utilization rates differ considerably among FTAs 
(JETRO, 2003; Augier et al., 2005).
5  Whether or not tariff concessions are readily 
available to private firms depends on how restrictive the ROOs are.  In addition, firms’ 
decisions to apply for tariff concessions depend on the existing margin between general 
(most-favored-nation) and preferential tariff rates (henceforth referred to as the tariff 
margin) and the costs incurred in applying for the concessions.  Hence, the magnitude of 
FTA export creation based on actual trade data is overstated and misleading.  
 
The second approach utilizes survey data at the firm level. For example, 
Takahashi & Urata (2009) used a survey conducted jointly by the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (REITI) and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (JCCI).  Another example is Wignaraja et al. (2010) based on a survey of firms 
in Thailand.  The main shortcoming of this approach is that the sample size is rather 
limited.  Particularly, the sample size in Takahashi & Urata (2009) is 1,688 firms, 
whereas that in Wignaraja et al. (2010) is 221 firms.  Findings based on such limited 
sample size are likely to be affected by sample selection bias.  
 
                                                 
3 Ando (2007) is another study using the gravity model.  Instead of using a dummy 
variable, patterns of the model’s residual before and after signing FTAs are examined to assess 
the impact of FTAs on trade.  
4See Soloaga & Winters (2001) and Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and  the works cited 
therein. 
5 For example, JETRO (2003) finds the preference margins (the ratio between preferential 
to actual trade) among ASEAN members in 2002 are quite low at 11.2 and 4.1 %, respectively, 
for Thailand and Malaysia.   This finding is consistent with that of Augier et al. (2005) for FTA 
between EU and southern Mediterranean countries and three central and eastern European 
countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary).   4
Against this backdrop, this paper sets out to examine the response of exporters to 
tariff concessions offered under the signed PTAs with a view to informing the debate on 
how to design ROOs and administrative procedures for enhancing the trade-creation 
effects of FTAs.  Estimates of the use of trade preferences and their actual utilization 
rates are provided using the administrative records of all FTA whose tariff reduction 
covers more than 80 per cent of product lines and have been in effect at least a year.  
Besides FTAs covered in the analysis include both North-South and South-South FTAs.  
In order to indicate the response of the private sector to FTA export creation, FTA 
utilization (FTAU), the ratio between the administrative records and actual trade, is 
calculated.  The calculated FTAU is further used as the dependent variable in an inter-
product (unbalanced) panel data econometric analysis in order to gain a better 
understanding of the patterns of FTAU across products. All manufacturing products are 
covered in this study so that sample selection bias is mitigated to a large extent. This 
paper can be regarded as the extended version of Kohpaiboon (2009)
6 which is an inter-
product cross-sectional analysis and emphasizes the effect of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area. 
 
Thailand is suitable as a case study of this subject for two reasons.  Firstly, 
administrative records for FTA implementation of Thai exporters are available for the 
period 2003-08.  This allows us to undertake a systematic analysis of FTA utilization by 
Thai exporters.  Secondly, Thai exporters have the potential to utilize tariff concessions 
offered by FTA because the Thai manufacturing sector is relatively broad based, 
compared to neighbouring countries.   
 
  The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents an analytical 
model of FTAs that helps delineate the key factors influencing decisions to apply for 
FTA tariff concessions.  Beginning with a brief history of policy shift from unilateral to 
bilateral FTAs, Section 3 illustrates trends and patterns in the administrative records of 
FTA implementation. Discussion of the empirical model is in Section 4. Data used for the 
                                                 
6 The paper was firstly presented in East Asian Economic Association (EAEA) 11, 
Manila, 2008.     5
study’s econometric analysis is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 presents results of the 
econometric analysis. Conclusions and policy inferences are in the final section (Section 
7). 
 
2. Analytical Model  
 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are a form of economic integration in which two or 
more countries (referred to as member countries) offer each other duty free access while 
maintaining their own external tariffs.  Since FTAs usually offer zero import tariffs, they 
can promote trade among member countries.
7  Not all the increased trade among 
members improves overall welfare because of its discriminatory nature in favor of 
member countries.  On many occasions, FTAs might divert trade away from more 
efficient non-member countries to less efficient member ones (i.e. trade diversion).  In 
such circumstances, prices of goods offered to consumers will be lower, but by less than 
the foregone tariff revenues, thereby negatively affecting social welfare.  
 
  Nevertheless, the zero tariff trade offered in FTAs does not necessarily 
materialize in practice. It depends on a number of factors. In this study, the partial 
equilibrium model developed in Cadot et al. (2002) is used with some modifications to 
identify the potential determinants of the rate of FTA utilization.  Specifically, we modify 
the original model to include industry-specific characteristics to influence this decision 
used in our empirical analysis.  Suppose that a final product (F), is produced by labor (L) 
and an intermediate product (I) according to the following technology expressed in 
equation 1.  Total intermediates are composed of two types, one is produced by member 
countries (M) and the other by non-member countries, denoted by the superscript, M and 
N. 
 







       
  
 (1) 
                                                 
7This happens regardless of the nature of increased trade, i.e. trade creation or trade 
diversion.    6
where   and  L I aa are the input-output coefficient of labor and intermediate goods, 
respectively.   
 
In equation 1,  M I and  N I are assumed to be physically perfect substitutes.  We 
assume that the latter’s price is equal to the world price  
NW
II P P   but lower than that of 
the former (
WM
II P P  .   
 
Let us assume that there are three countries, Countries A, B, and the rest of the 
world.   Country A is a producer and exporter of product F and Country B is the importer 
with a tariff rate of  F t  So, consumers in Country B will pay   1
W
FF P t  .  If Countries A 
and B form a FTA, goods produced in one of the two countries can be exported to the 
other at preferential (reduced) tariff rates  
FTA
F t provided that they satisfy ROO.     
Assuming that RoO under the FTA between Countries A and B is in a regional value 
content form in which goods will be eligible if, and only if, intermediate inputs sourced 
from member countries (local content of the products) reach the agreed level.  That is,   
 
      :0 , 1 MN M II I     (2) 
 
Equation 2 stresses that intermediates sourced from member countries  M I must 
exceed  *100 per cent of total intermediates used.   The higher the value of  , the more 
restrictive the ROO.  When  0   , ROO do not have any restrictive impact and   and  NM I I
can be any non-negative number.  In contrast,  1    implies that all intermediates must 
come from member countries.
8  For simplicity, we assume that Country B does not 




I I P P   and assuming ROO constraints are binding, the inequality sign in 
equation 2 turns out to be an equality sign, which is then rearranged into equation 3; 
 
                                                 
8 Equation 2 makes sense if and only if 








 (3)   
 
What Equation 3 indicates is, producers of Product F in Country F need to source 
local intermediates ( 0
M I  ) in order to apply for FTA tariff concessions. Consequently, 
the average price of the intermediate product incurred by producers of Product F in 
Country A is the weighted average between world price and domestic price with   as a 
weight (equation 4). 
 
    1
M W
I II P PP     (4)   
  
Equation 4 shows that the binding ROO constraints act as tariffs on intermediates.  








 , the implicit tariff of intermediates would be  
M
I tq  .  To 
illustrate the net impact on the resource pulling effect of FTA, value added in two 
different scenarios, applying and not applying for FTA tariff concessions, 
( , and 
FTA W VA VA respectively) is compared.  That is, firms in country A would apply for 
FTA tariff concessions when value added in the former is greater than the latter.   
  
 
FTA FTA WORLD NB VA VA   
                                   
FTA W M W
F FFI I I tt Pa t q P     (5) 
  where      1
FTA W FTA
F FF I I VA P t t a P     
   
WORLD W W
F II VA P a P   
    
  That is, firms in country A are eligible for FTA tariff concession if, and only if, 
0
FTA NB  .  According to equation 5, FTA utilization is related positively to the margin 
between general (MFN) and preferential tariff rates and negatively to the degree of 
restrictiveness of ROO.  
 
   8
3. First Look: FTAs in Thailand 
 
3.1 Trade Policy Shift: From Non-discriminatory Liberalization to FTAs  
 
Over the past three decades, Thailand benefited from unilateral tariff reductions 
and the success of multilateral agreements in the context of General Agreement of Trade 
and Tariff and the World Trade Organization now (WTO).  The former contributed to 
improve international competitiveness and placed the country to be attractive for export-
oriented FDI inflow during the mid 1980s, whereas the latter created a conducive global 
environment for international trade expansion (Kohpaiboon, 2006; Schott, 2003, 2004, 
Sally, 2007).  This eventually contributed to the export take-off of Thai manufacturing 
products and economic boom during the late 1980s and the first half of 1990s. It was 
consistent with the global pattern wherein unilateral and multilateral frameworks 
accounted for almost 90 per cent of the global tariff reduction over the past three decades 
(Martin & Ng, 2005).   
 
  Since then unilateral non-discriminatory liberalization has slowed down, and 
political attention and negotiating resources have switched from the WTO to preferential 
trade agreements (mainly bilateral free trade agreements).  From the new millennium 
onwards, Thailand has been enthusiastic in signing FTAs with countries around the world.  
Table 1 presents all the FTAs Thailand has been involved in since the 1990s.  While there 
were 18 FTAs on record, only seven were practically in use, namely ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA), Thailand-New Zealand FTA (TNFTA), 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), ASEAN-China FTA, 
ASEAN -Japan FTA, and ASEAN-Korea FTA.  Interestingly, as revealed in the last 
column in Table 1, there are four FTAs (AFTA, TAFTA, TNFTA, and JTEPA) where 
tariff reduction covers more than 80 per cent of product lines before 2009.     
 
  Another interesting pattern is that FTAs after 2006 tend to be regional, such as 
ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Korea, ASEAN plus 3, ASEAN plus 6.  This was in contrast to 
those signed before and was due to the fact that FTAs occupied centre stage in Thai trade   9
policy during the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  Thaksin’s CEO 
style and its dominant imprint on government played a pivotal role in negotiating FTAs. 
As argued in Sally (2007: 1606-7), several major bilateral FTA negotiations were 
launched during Thaksin’s administration and done in a rush without careful preparation 
and without anticipating the inherent technical as well as political problems. To a certain 
extent, many of the negotiations turned out to be politically controversial.  After the 2006 
coup, a new constitution was promulgated in 2007, replacing the interim constitution of 
2006.  Under the new Constitution, executing international trade agreements is subject to 
parliamentary approval (Article 190). This slowed down progress of FTAs.  For example, 
the Chairman of the Board of Trade of Thailand claimed that ASEAN-Korea was 
postponed simply because of Article 190 (Nation, 2007).  Hence, since 2006 there has not 
been any new bilateral FTA initiative. 
 
The final observation from Table 1 concerns the systematic difference between 
FTAs signed with higher income countries (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and 
Korea) and those signed with developing countries.  In the former, the tariff reduction 
granted by Thailand’s FTA partner is likely to have an immediate effect and cover most 
tariff lines.  Negotiation about tariff reduction in the latter is still ongoing.  The tariff 
reduction timetable is rather long, so it is subject to uncertainties regarding possible 
policy reversal.  
 
  3.2 Tariff Cuts under Signed FTAs.  
In Table 2, most-favored-nation (MFN) and preferential tariff rates are presented 
for Thailand’s major FTA partners.  They are the major economies in ASEAN 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), Australia and Japan.  We exclude 
Singapore and New Zealand from Table 2.
9  The first inference drawn from Table 2 is 
that the MFN tariff in Australia and Japan is already low so a margin of tariff preference, 
i.e. the difference between MFN/applied tariff rate and FTA preferential rate, (henceforth 
                                                 
9 The exclusion of Singapore from the table is obvious because its tariff rates are virtually 
zero. New Zealand is not included because Thailand-New Zealand FTA is under a paperless 
system.  This makes how exporters respond to FTA tariff preferences untraceable.   10
referred to the tariff margin) seems to be very limited.  For example, the average applied 
tariff rates for Australia were 3.4 per cent in 2006.  The corresponding figure for Japan 
was 3.1 per cent.   Thus, it is unlikely that the tariff margin is less than 5 per cent.  As 
illustrated in Panel B of Table 2, more than 80 per cent of product lines in both countries 
have a tariff margin of less than 5%.  As indicated in the last row in Table 2, the limited 
tariff margin is largely because the MFN tariff is already zero instead of exemption from 
the FTA tariff reduction schedule.   
 
  This is in contrast to South-South FTA like AFTA.  Generally, the average MFN 
rate of original ASEAN members was low in absolute term, although still a bit higher 
than Australia and Japan.  It was in the narrow range between 6.2-7.9 per cent, as a result 
of unilateral tariff reductions driven by commitments in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in the mid 1990s. On average, they offered a preferential tariff rate of 2 per cent 
for ASEAN members so that the tariff margin was about 4-6 per cent.  When the tariff 
margin across products is concerned, more than 70 per cent of product lines are in the 
tariff margin category of less than or equal to 5 %.   Vietnam seems to be an exception 
among Thailand’s FTA partners as it exhibits a substantial tariff margin. The MFN rate 
remains at 16.8 per cent.  Interestingly, the tariff cut under AFTA from Vietnam seems to 
be generous as it was substantial and ahead of the schedule for ASEAN new members.  
The average preferential tariff under AFTA in 2006 was 2.5 so the average tariff margin 
was about 14 per cent. In addition, as a consequence of the cascading tariff structure 
popular among developing countries, including ASEAN members, variations in tariffs 
across product in Vietnam remain substantial. So that there are about 40 per cent of 
product lines whose tariff margin is greater than 10%.   
 
3.3 FTA Usage  
Official records of exporters’ responses to FTA preferential trade are administered 
in Thailand by the Bureau of Preferential Trade (BPT), Department of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce. All exporters who want to apply for a FTA preferential tariff 
must fill in a form in order to provide necessary information related to product 
originality.  If products comply with FTA ROO, official records of certificate of origin   11
(c/o) will be issued.  Since issuing c/o certificates takes few days, firms can request for 
official c/o in advance (i.e. three months).  The BPT provided us with access to data on 
FTA administrative records for the period 2003-present (2008). Original data is available 
at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) classification. 
 
Table 3 presents selected indicators of FTA usage, how Thai exporters utilize 
signed FTAs.  The top two rows in Table 3 present a number of items where exporters 
applied for tariff preferences and their share to total products.  These products are 
classified according to six digit HS. This is to illustrate the scope of product lines that 
would be beneficial from the signed FTAs. The next two rows report the sum of export 
value of Top 10 and 20 products as a per cent of the total value of preferential exports in 
order to illustrate the degree of product value concentration.  The last two rows indicate 
utilization rates, the ratio of administrative records to total exports, of each FTA and its 
variation coefficient across products.
10   
 
With regard to product coverage, the number of items where Thai exporters have 
applied for FTA tariff preferences constituted about one fourth of total product lines.  The 
Malaysia figure provides us an upper limit. There were 1,432 products items for which 
Thai exporters applied for FTA tariff preferences when selling their products to Malaysia 
in 2008.  It accounted for 27.4 per cent of total product lines at HS six digit classification.  
On the other hand, the Philippines have the lowest number at about 900 items or 17 per 
cent of total product line. Vietnam, Japan and Australia are in the middle between 
Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively (Table 3).  
 
Products traded under signed FTAs have been highly concentrated to only a few 
items so far.  The cumulative export value share of Top 10 product items which applied 
for FTA tariff preferences was in the wide range between 30-62 per cent of total products 
traded under the FTAs.  The product value concentration was least in the case of Vietnam 
and highest in the case of Australia.  When the cumulative value share of Top 20 product 
items is used, the degree of product value concentration increased significantly in spite of 
                                                 
10 The calculation of FTA utilization rate is made at the four digit HS classification.   12
there being no change in ranking. The range of the share of Top 20 product items 
narrowed to between 44.9-72 per cent.   That is, the dollar value of the top 20 items (out 
of total 1,364 items) in which Thai exporters applied FTA tariff preferences for the 
Vietnamese market accounted for 45 per cent of total administrative record values.   
 
The final inference is about the relative importance of official records to total 
export, FTA utilization rate (FTAU).  In 2008, FTAU ranged between 22.7 per cent 
(Japan) and 62.5 per cent (Australia).  When viewing the low FTAU in Japan the fact that 
2008 was the first year of JTEPA needs to be taken into consideration given the already 
low tariff rate.  As shown in Figure 1, FTAU might to a certain extent increase over time 
as exporters become accustomed to tariff preferences.  For countries whose FTAU are in 
the top-3 (Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines), the high FTAU was largely driven by 
vehicle trade (HS8701-8704).  When vehicle trade is excluded, their FTAU  dropped 
significantly in the cases of the Philippines and Australia.  For Vietnam and Japan, FTAU 
included and excluded vehicle trade seems virtually indifferent. When vehicle trade is 
excluded, FTAU of Vietnam becomes the highest.  It is not surprising as Vietnam’s tariff 
margin remains high across several product lines.   FTAU in Indonesia, which remained 
high after vehicle trade was excluded, would reflect the imposition of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) on agricultural imports (bea masuk terbhan) (Fane & Warr, 2006) so that many 
Thai agricultural exporters opt to apply AFTA preferential tariffs to the alleviate 
additional costs incurred by the NTBs.
11   
 
4. Empirical Model 
As discussed in Section 2,  i FTAU  is related positively to tariff margins and negatively to 
the degree of ROO restrictiveness.  While the former is directly measured by the 
difference between general (most-favored-nations) and preferential tariffs,
FTA
ii tt  , the 
latter is proxied by the extent to which goods manufacturers procure raw materials and 
intermediates locally, i.e. backward linkages index   i BLI .  i BLI  is constructed based on 
                                                 
11 For example, official tariff on food crops (rice and corn) is 3 per cent but actual tariff is 
8 per cent (Fane & Warr, 2006).    13
the Leontief inter-industry accounting framework, which provides for the capture of both 
direct and indirect (inter-sectoral) repercussions in the measurement process.  j BLI  shows 
the total units of output required, directly and indirectly, from all sectors (including the 
unit of output delivered in response to final demand by the given sector) when the 
demand for the j
th commodity rises by one unit.  In general, we expect that the higher the 
j BLI , the greater the ability an industry j
th possesses in complying with ROO, i.e. the 
positive expected sign of coefficient corresponding to  j BLI .  Nonetheless, the 
relationship between  j BLI  and  i FTAU  might be non-linear.  For industries with a high 
local content (i.e. the high value of  j BLI ), the role of  j BLI in deciding to use FTAs 
becomes less important. To address a possible non-linear relationship, the squared term 
of BLI is introduced in the empirical model.  
 
  In addition to  and  i BLI , three industry-specific factors are incorporated 
into the model, based on the fact that compiling with ROO is not costless (e.g. Koshien, 
1983; Herin, 1986; Krueger, 1999; James, 2006).  This necessitates incurring additional 
costs which discourage firms from applying for tariff concessions. Such costs include not 
only administrative fees, but also opportunity costs when firms must set up a group of 
people in order to deal with all the requirements from government officials (e.g. 
calculating regional content, reporting sources of imported intermediates and their 
corresponding prices, matching tariff lines, etc.). All are referred to as the administrative 
cost. Therefore, it seems sensible to assume that the administrative costs are fixed.  In the 
presence of fixed costs, firms deciding to apply for FTA tariff concessions would be 
expected. 
 
These three industry-specific factors are foreign presence, the degree of existence 
of conglomerated firms, the ‘historical trade record, and the ratio of parts and 
components in total trade.  Firstly, it is likely that foreign firms behave differently from 
local ones in a number of aspects, including applying for FTA tariff concessions. Foreign 
firms, on the one hand, tend to be larger in size, so that it is more likely for them to 
FTA
ii tt   14
absorb the administrative costs as opposed to local firms.  Thus, a positive relationship 
between foreign presence and the utilization rate is expected.  Nevertheless, as argued in 
the multinational enterprises and product fragmentation literature (e.g. Jones, 2000; Jones 
& Kierzkowski, 2001: Athukorala, 2006), efficiency-seeking FDI have become 
increasingly important in East Asia over the past two decades.  More importantly, these 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to be located in export processing zones in order 
to receive input tariff exemption. Therefore, foreign firms might not be attracted to FTA 
tariff concessions. The relationship between foreign presence and FTA utilization could 
be negative. Hence, the relationship between foreign presence (FOR) and FTAU   is 
ambiguous. 
 
Foreign presence ( i FOR ) is measured by the proportion of the output share of 
foreign firms to that of the industry as a whole.  In some previous empirical studies, 
employment or the capital share of foreign firms have been accustomed to measure 
foreign presence. Expressing foreign presence as an employment share tends to 
underestimate the actual role of foreign affiliates because MNE affiliates tend to be more 
capital intensive than local, non-affiliated firms. On the other hand, capital share can 
easily be distorted by the presence of foreign ownership restrictions.  Such a restriction 
was in effect in Thailand during the study period (Kohpaiboon, 2006a).  Capital share 
would not be a good proxy for the foreign presence in a country in a case such as 
Thailand where there is a foreign ownership restriction.  Consequently, output share is 
the preferred proxy.  
 
  Thirdly, the share of conglomerate firms   i CON is introduced in the model to 
capture the firm size effect on FTAU.  In this study, a conglomerate firm is defined as a 
firm in which the same ultimate parent has a majority-ownership share. Then their output 
share to total industry is calculated. The conglomerate firm would be in a better position, 
as opposed to small and medium firms, in spreading the fixed administrative costs 
incurred. Therefore, the sign of coefficient corresponding to CON is expected to be 
positive. Thirdly, the initial trade before FTA becomes effective   i INT  is added simply 
because in the presence of fixed costs involved, sales volume must reach a certain level in   15
order to avoid excessive per-unit fixed costs (economies of scale).  Hence, a positive 
relationship between  i INT  and FTAU is expected.     
 
   Finally, , it PC , the share of parts and components (P&C) trade in the total trade of 
the industry i is introduced in the empirical model. This is due to the fact that one 
emerging pattern of international trade and investment in Asia is the increasing 
importance of global production sharing, the breakup of the production processes into 
geographically separated stages.
12 One consequence of the increasing importance of 
global production sharing is the rapid expansion of P&C trade across countries. This 
feature is far more important in East Asia than elsewhere (Athukorala, 2003, 2006: 
Athukorala & Kohpaiboon, 2009). Since the importance of global production sharing is 
expected to continue, it is worth examining the extent to which such a rapidly growing 
product line uses the offered FTA tariff preference.  As the whole production process is 
broken up and located in several locations, domestic content tends to be lower than the 
final goods trade.  This would make more difficult for P&Cs to comply with the rules of 
origin. Hence, a negative coefficient is expected for  , it PC  
 
All in all, the empirical model of determinants of FTAU is as follows; 
 
   
2
,, , , , , , ,,, , ,,
FTA




 where   , it FTAU = FTA utilization (the ratio between the official record of  
    FTA implementation and actual exports) in industry i
th  at time t
 
FTA
ii tt   (+) = the margin between general and preferential tariff rates in    
industry i
th  
  , it BLI     (+)  =  the degree of  backward linkage index of industry i
th as a  
    proxy of the ability of products to compile with ROO 
                                                 
12  In the recent literature on international trade an array of alternative terms have been 
used to describe this phenomenon, including ‘international production fragmentation’, ‘vertical 
specialisation’, ‘slicing the value chain’ and ‘outsourcing’.     16
2
, it BLI     (-)  = the squared term of  , it BLI  
, it FOR    (+/-)  = the degree of foreign presence in industry i
th at time t  
   proxied by the output share of foreign firms 
, it CON    (+)   = the degree of conglomeration in industry i
th at time t  
   proxied by the output share of conglomerate firms as  
   defined in the text above 
, it INT       (+)  = the export value averaged the past three years of product i  
   at time t  
, it PC     (-)  = the ratio of parts and component trade in total trade of 
   product i at time t  
 
 (The theoretical expected signs are in parentheses) 
 
5. Data Description 
 
Originally, the administrative records of FTA implementation are at the HS six-
digit level of disaggregation.  The original data have two main limitations.  Firstly, there 
are a number of c/o records whose HS codes do not match actual trade data, either HS 
1996 or 2002 Revisions.  For example, the administrative records reported export values 
of HS 200890, 321010, 350210 from Thailand to Indonesia in 2003 records.  Such items 
do not have trade data collected by Custom Duty.  Presumably, such errors occur because 
private firms had difficulties in specifying product categories in filling out c/o forms at 
the high level of disaggregation.  To overcome this problem, the original data at six-digit 
levels are aggregated into four digit levels.  The second problem is that there are many 
cases in which FTAU exceeds 100 per cent.  There are two possible explanations for the 
excessive FTAU.  Firstly, it is simply due to errors in the data collection process, referred 
to as Type I Error.  Secondly, since official c/o can be issued in advance (see above), 
exporters tend to overstate their true demand to more than they actually need in order to 
gain flexibility in doing business.  As a result, it is possible for \FTAU to exceed 100 per 
cent (referred to as Type II Error).  If it is Type II Error, we would not expect vast   17
differences between c/o records and actual export values.  In this study, we arbitrarily use 
a 120 per cent FTAU to identify Type I Error.  Specifically if FTAU exceeds 120 per 
cent, it is classified as Type I Error. As a result, there are 1,480 out of 26,858 
observations subject to Type I Error.  Only observations which are subject to Type I Error 
are dropped from the sample.  
 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel between 2003 and 2008.  For original 
ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines), the data set is a panel 
between 2003 and 2008.  Data for Vietnam starts in 2006 as the year where tariff 
reduction took effect. Regarding Australia, the data period is from 2005 to 2008.  Since 
JTEPA was in effect in late 2007, the 2008 data is used only.      
 
Our econometric analysis focuses on manufacturing products which account for 
around 75% of exports from Thailand to Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. The definition of manufacturing products in this study follows 
the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) and international 
concordance is used to match with the HS system (i.e. 25-97 net of other primary 
products). Agricultural and other primary products are excluded because key 
determinants of FTAU in these products tend to be different to manufacturing.  For 
example, the ROO constraint is unlikely to be binding. In addition, as argued in Fane & 
Warr (2007), agricultural exports to Indonesia from Thailand are subject to non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs).    
 
Backward linkage index   , it BLI is constructed in two years according to the 
availability of Thailand’s input-output table, 2000 and 2005.   Hence, ,2000 i BLI is used for 
data between 2003 and 2004, whereas  ,2005 i BLI is used for data from 2005 onwards. Note 
that Thailand’s input-output table is a complementary import type where the import 
content of each transaction is separately identified and allocated to an import matrix so 
that  , it BLI  measures only domestic content.   , it BLI   Data of  it CON   and  , it FOR are 
obtained from Kohpaiboon & Ramstetter (2008), using data on large corporations from   18
Business On-Line (2008).  Data is available for 1996 and 2006.  The former is used as the 
proxy between 2003 and 2005, whereas the latter is utilized for 2006 onwards. Both 
, it CON and  , it FOR  are classified according to the International Standard of Industrial 
Classification (ISIC).  Since classifications of , it BLI , , it CON and , it FOR  are not yet in the 
HS classification, international concordance is used to be converted into HS 
classification.  Finally  , it INT  is the annual export value in the past three years.  For 
example,  ,2003 i INT is the annual export value average between 2000 and 2002.   
 
    The P&C list developed in Athukorala & Kohpaiboon (2009) is used to 
construct , it PC .  The list uses parts in the Board Economics Classification (BEC) 42 and 
53 as a point of departure. Additional lists of parts are included based on firm interviews 
in Kohpaiboon (2009). Lists are initially disaggregated at the six-digit HS classification, 
and then summed up to four digit in order to determine share of P&C in total trade at the 
four digit HS classification. Table 4 provides a summary of variables used in the 
econometric analysis (Panel A) and the matrix of correlation coefficients.   
 
6. Results 
6.1 Baseline Estimation 
Initially, all samples are pooled and estimated using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The country-specific effect is used in this experimental regression analysis. 
Specifically, a binary dummy variable for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam 
and Japan is introduced.  Australia is selected as a control group.  Since the dependent 
variable, FTAU, is censored, i.e. we do not observe values of FTAU less than zero (the 
left censoring) and greater than 100 per cent (the right censoring), OLS estimation would 
be biased and inconsistent.  Hence, random-effect Tobit (weighted maximum likelihood) 
estimator is used to obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates. In order to 
provide the robustness check of the estimation result, the corresponding fixed- and 
random-effect estimators are also reported.     
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Table 5 provides the estimation results, namely pooled OLS, random-effects, and 
fixed-effects, and random-effects Tobit estimations. All equations pass the overall 
statistical significant at the one per cent level. Clearly, the estimation results are 
insensitive to choices of estimation methods. Nevertheless, because of the nature of 
censored dependent variables, the following discussion is based on random-effect Tobit 
model estimation (Column 5.4). All coefficients are statistically significant at the five per 
cent level or better with theoretical expected signs. The coefficient corresponding to 
FTA
ii tt   is significant at the one per cent level, implying that the tariff margin does matter 
for the private sector in deciding whether or not to apply for FTA tariff concessions. It 
also implies that applying for such tariff concessions is costly to a certain extent.   
Otherwise, the positive relationship would not be revealed.  
 
Both coefficients corresponding to , it BLI and 
2
, it BLI  are statistically different from 
zero at the one per cent level, suggesting that the non-monotonic relationship between 
, it BLI and , it FTAU .  The coefficients corresponding to , it BLI and 
2
, it BLI  are positive and 
negative, respectively.  The positive and significant coefficient corresponding to  i BLI  
indicates that the ROO constraint is binding.  All other things being equal, products with 
greater backward linkages (domestic value added content) tend to register a higher level 
of , it FTAU . The negative and significant coefficient associated with 
2
, it BLI  suggests that 
the positive effect of , it BLI on , it FTAU would be diminishing. In industries which rely 
largely on domestic inputs, the effect of  , it BLI on , it FTAU  becomes less 
 
The statistical significance of  , it CON  strengthens the above finding about ROO 
binding constraint.  Since there are administrative costs in compiling ROO, it is local and 
conglomerated firms that intensively utilize FTA privileges, as opposed to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs).  The negative coefficient associated with  , it FOR  reflects the 
dominant role of export-oriented foreign firms operating in the Thai manufacturing 
sector.  These firms actively participate in global production networks and their 
international trade tends to benefit from tariff exemption schemes available in many   20
developing countries. Hence, the need for FTA tariff preference becomes less relevant for 
their operation.   
 
The coefficient corresponding to  , it PC turns out to be negative and statistically 
significant as hypothesized.  Since the production process is sliced up, value added in 
each location tends to be lower.  Hence, it would be more difficult for parts and 
components to comply with rules of origin and regional content requirements concerning 
style in particular as opposed to final goods. It is also not easy for parts and components 
to comply with change-in-tariff-lines ROO as international trade of parts and components 
occur at the highly disaggregated level, six digit HS classification.  For example, 
electrical and electronics goods and the related parts and components usually belong to 
the same tariff codes at the HS-six digit level, which is the normal base for designing this 
type of ROOs.  Hence, it is unlikely to comply with change-in-tariff line ROO 
(Kohpaiboon 2010: Appendix 2).
13      
 
Another implication from the observed statistical significance of  i INT is that it is 
mostly the established exporters who benefit from FTA concessions. This highlights the 
potential role of FTAs in facilitating instead of creating trade.  Products must be traded 
substantially before (i.e. in the pre- signing FTAs period) to ensure that FTA export 
creation is considerable. For products that have yet to be traded during the pre-FTA 
period, the effect of a FTA in creating trade would be limited. Our findings cast doubt on 
the strategy of using FTAs to open up new markets, as is claimed by policymakers.   
 
Table 6 illustrates the Tobit regression by individual countries as a robustness 
check to the multi-country regression above.  Note that the sample size varies across FTA 
signatories according to the year they began using FTA.  For example, the sample size of 
original ASEAN members like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is relatively large as 
                                                 
13 Specifically, electrical appliances assembly plants is Thailand which use imported bare 
printed circuit board (BPCB) together with other locally procured electronic components (e.g. 
diode, integrated circuits, semi-conductors) to printed circuit board assembly (PCBA) for export 
are not eligible to FTA concessions because BPCBs and PCBAs belong to the same HS code 
853690 (Kohpaiboon, 2010).   21
opposed to that of Japan which began to use FTA in November 2007. Clearly, estimates 
by individual countries provide more or less the same inference about FTA determinants.  
Tariff margin and pre-FTA trade are the key factors which encourage firms to use FTA 
tariff privileges. Local and conglomerate firms are more likely to use them, as opposed to 
foreign firms. Finished products instead of parts and components are the main goods 
whose producers apply for FTA tariff privileges. Rule of origin is the binding constraint 
for firms to make use of FTA.  
 
Another interesting pattern emerged from Table 6 is the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient corresponding to the tariff margin, which varies significantly across 
countries.  This seems to be related to dollar costs complying with rules of origin, 
including administrative costs from importing countries.  In general, the magnitude 
would reflect how difficult firms acquire FTA tariff privileges.  In a given FTA where the 
process to obtain tariff privileges is more difficult, all other things being equal, firms 
must require a larger tariff margin. Hence, the estimated coefficient in this case is 
expected to be low. The clear pattern is that the estimated coefficient of developed 
country-FTA counterpart is higher than that of developing countries, like ASEAN 
members. Among developing country counterparts, coefficients across developing 
countries are in the narrow range between 0.5 and 1.  This finding will be elaborated 
further in the next sub section.  
 
6.2 Assess Cost of Compiling ROO 
As mentioned earlier, compiling ROO incurs dollar costs to exporters and the 
costs tend to be fixed.  If the hypothesis is correct, the role of tariff margins on the private 
sector’s decision to apply for FTA tariff concessions would be relevant in a certain range 
only.  For example, if dollar costs incurred by compiling ROO are equivalent to a 5 per 
cent tariff margin, the statistical relationship between  , it FTAU and 
FTA
ii tt   would be 
found only in the neighborhood of the 5% tariff margin.  For those outside the 
neighborhood, the tariff margin would not be a crucial factor for a firms’ decision to use 
FTA tariff preferences.  5% can be used as an estimated cost of compiling ROO.  
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Therefore, to estimate the costs of compiling ROO, a series of experimental runs 
are conducted. Equation 1 is re-estimated with various sub samples according to tariff 
margin. Particularly, Equation 1 is estimated by random-effect Tobit estimation in a 
sample whose tariff margin is greater than X %, where  X I
  .  The estimated cost of 
compiling ROO is
* X , a positive integral that the statistical significance of 
FTA
ii tt   
disappears.  All are estimated using random-effect Tobit estimation.  
 
All estimating results of the experimental runs are reported in Table 7.  Based on 
our experimental run, the coefficient corresponding to 
FTA
ii tt   is statistically significant 
until  X 4 per cent.  When   5,8 X  , statistical significance is found in the case at
8 X  .  When  X 9 per cent, the coefficient of 
FTA
ii tt  is not different from zero 
statistically.  Our experimental run suggests that the cost of compiling ROO would be a 
wide range between 5 and 8 per cent.  
 
The statistical significance of  , it CON , it FOR and  , it INT remains in all sub samples. 
This finding provides a robustness check on the relative importance of firm-specific 
factors and pre-FTA trade on deciding to use FTA.  In contrast, the coefficient 
corresponding to , it BLI  turns out to be statistically insignificant when  X 8 per cent. 
When the tariff margin exceeds the cost of compiling ROO, firms tend to apply for FTA 
tariff preference regardless of the extent to which their production relies on domestic 
inputs.    
 
Interestingly, the series of experimental runs undertaken by individual countries is 
presented in Table 8.  The estimates of the Japanese case are not available because of the 
relatively small sample size.  In general, our finding here is in line with the conclusions 
above in that costs in complying ROO vary from country to country.  Where we diverge 
from above is that the cost difference seems substantial, ranging from 2 per cent in the 
case of Australia to 10 per cent for Indonesian exports.  For Malaysia and Vietnam, the 
costs are about 4 per cent, whereas they are slightly higher in the case of Philippines (6 
per cent).  This suggests that a significant portion of the costs comes from our FTA   23
counterparts.  This is likely to occur at the custom procedure. Not surprisingly, such costs 
are higher for developing country counterparts. 
 
 Such insight would be relevant for Japan, which is enthusiastic about FTAs as a 
mode for further liberalization and the leader among developed countries in negotiating 
and signing FTAs.  Our finding suggests that FTA negotiation on tariff cuts schedules 
must be undertaken in a more comprehensive way.  Particularly, not only rules of origin, 
but also trade facilitation issue must be incorporated and considered at the negotiation 
table to ensure that the FTA-induced trade effects can be materialized.  Custom procedure 
should be the policy highlight. This is especially true for developing country FTA 
counterparts. Technical and financial assistance to improve capabilities on custom 
procedure would be on the top priority within policy measures to promote the use of 
FTAs. 
    
7. Conclusions  
 
This paper has examined how the private sector responds to export opportunities 
induced by FTAs, using evidence from the Thai manufacturing sector during the period 
2003-08. The analysis began with examining the trends and patterns in administrative 
records of FTA implementation, and then inter-product panel-data econometric analysis 
was undertaken to gain a better understanding FTA utilization across products. The novel 
feature of the analysis is that it makes an explicit distinction between actual and 
preferential trade in which the later is measured by the administrative records of FTA 
implementation.  In addition, the cost of compiling ROO is estimated. 
 
Our findings suggest that while FTAs have potential to facilitate trade among 
members, the product coverage is limited.  Products that have benefited from FTA tariff 
preferences so far are highly concentrated. In 2008 administrative records of the top 20 
items out of total (i.e. more than 5000 items) accounted for 45 per cent for Vietnam 
(lower bound) and 72 per cent for Australia (upper bound). So far the utilization of FTAs 
is moderate, ranging between 22.7 per cent and 62.5 per cent. This points to a serious 
problem in using actual trade data (based on customs records) to evaluate the impact of   24
FTA on trade, as has been common practice in gravity-model based studies. The actual 
trade taking place under FTAs could well be much less than the recorded trade of a given 
country because there are costs involved in applying for FTA tariff concessions. 
 
Our (unbalanced) panel data econometric analysis suggests that rules of origin 
constraints are binding.  The estimated cost in compiling ROO is equivalent to a 5 and 8 
per cent tariff. Interestingly, such a cost varies significantly across FTA partners 
suggesting the presence of obstacles on the importing country’s part as well.  Hence, 
ability to comply with ROO, as well as tariff margins, does matter in firms’ decisions to 
use FTA.  Another interesting finding is the relative importance of pre-signing FTA 
trade. Our results suggest that it is unlikely for countries to use FTA to open new 
markets, products yet to be traded before signing FTA.  So far it has been predominantly 
local firms, in particular large local conglomerates, which utilize FTA tariff concessions, 
compared to foreign firms and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Companies trading 
products under global production sharing are less likely to apply for FTA tariff 
preference because of both dollar costs incurred by ROO imposition and limited tariff 
margins.   
 
Two policy inferences can be drawn from this paper.  Firstly, promoting exports 
by maximizing the number of FTAs, while ignoring the nature of FTA partners is 
unlikely to be successful. The nature of a FTA partner does matter, whether or not trade 
potential supported by a signed FTA could materialize. Our finding suggests that 
substantial trade before signing FTAs would be a reasonable criterion in selecting FTA 
counterparts. A FTA alone is unlikely to be used as a tool to open up markets for 
products yet to be traded.  Secondly, for those who have less hope in first-best, world-
wide liberalization through World Trade Organization negotiations and advocate FTAs as 
a mode for further liberalization, policy emphasis to harness the trade-induced effects of 
signed FTAs should be on reducing costs incurred from the presence of ROO.  There is 
room for inter-government cooperation to mitigate any cumbersome obstacles preventing 
firms from making use of FTA.   25
Table 1 
FTAs Involved in Thailand from 1990 onwards 
 
FTA Signed Effective  Remarks 
ASEAN   1990  2006  Tariff cuts were completed for original ASEAN members in 2006.   
Australia  Jul-04  Jan-05  Australia Tariff Reduction-83% (2005), 96.1%(2010) and 100% (2015): Thailand 
Tariff Reduction-49.5% (2005), 93.3 %(2010) and 100% (2025) 
New Zealand  Apr-05 Jul-05  New Zealand Tariff Reduction- 79.1 (2005), 88.5% (2010), and 100% (2015); 
Thailand Tariff Reduction-54.1% (2005), 89.7% (2010) and 100% (2025) 
Bahrain 2002    Under  Negotiation 
India  Oct-03 n.a.  82 items under Early Harvest Program; the rest under negotiation 
Pakistan 2004    Under  Study 
Japan  Apr-07 Nov-07  Japan Tariff Reduction-86.1% (2007) and 91.2 % (2017); Thailand Tariff 
Reduction-31.1% (2007) and 97.6% (2017) 
Peru  Nov-05 Jul-10  Tariff Reduction between Thailand and Peru; 50% (2010) and 70% (2015) 
Chile 2006    Under  Study 
BIMSTEC  Jul-10  2013  Tariff Reduction Program for India, Sri Lanka and Thailand- 10% (2013) and 
60% (2016) 
Tariff Reduction Program for  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Mynamar-10% 
(2011) and 60% (2014) 
ASEAN-Japan  Apr-08 Jun-08  Japan Tariff Reduction 90% (2008): ASEAN-6 Tariff Reduction 93.8% (2018); 
Vietnam Tariff Reduction 94% (2025); Myanmar, Lao and Cambodia 93% (2026)
ASEAN-Korea  Feb-09 Jan-10  Korea Tariff Reduction 90% (2010); Thailand Tariff Reduction 83%(2010),l 
84%(2012), 89% (2016) and 90% (2017). 
(cont.) 
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Table 1(cont.) 
FTA Signed Effective  Remarks 
ASEAN-India  Aug-09 Jan-10  71% (2013) and 80% (2016) for Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and India
ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand 
Feb-09 Mar-10  Australia Tariff Reduction 96% (2010) and 100% (2020); New Zealand Tariff 
Reduction 90.1(2012) and 100 %(2020); Thailand Tariff Reduction 89.8%(2015) 
and 98.8% (2020) 
ASEAN-China Nov-04 Nov-04  10 Year Transition Periods 
ASEAN plus 3*  Under Negotiation  Initiated by November 1999 in Manila (Informal Asian Summit 3rd)    
ASEAN plus 6**  Under Negotiation  Initiated by August 2006 in AEM-METI and AEM+3 Meeting in Kaula Lumpur 
ASEAN-EU  Under Negotiation  Initiated by November 2007 in AEM-EU Meeting in Brunei 
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Table 2 
General and AFTA-preferential tariffs of Selected Countries and Distribution of the Margin between General and Preferential Tariff 
Rates (%) 
 
   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines Vietnam  Australia  Japan 
















Preferential Tariffs in 2006  2   2   2.1   2.5  1.1  2.4 
Distribution of the margin between general and preferential tariffs  (% of total tariff lines)   
0 t    34.1 59.4  9.5  34.1  85  53.9 
05 t     41.9 12.7 70.7 18.3  15  27.8 
51 0 t     15.2 6.8 16.9 6.2  0  15.5 
10 20 t     8.3 15.4 1.7  9.8  0  3 
20 30 t     0.2 4.4 0.7 9.7  0  0 
30 t    0.3 1.2 0.6 21.9  0  0 
#tariff lines        5,391         5,222         5,390         5,219   5,218  5,039 
# tariff lines subject to 0 %% 
tariff 558  2,798  126  1,602  2,447 
2,499 
Notes: * data for 1994; The number in parentheses indicate weighted tariff rates in which 2005 import value is used as the weight.; 
General tariff rates are MFN rate for all countries, except Thailand where applied rates are used.** 1996  
Sources: Data of 1994/95 are from Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon (2007) whereas the others are based on Author’s calculation using 
official documents reported to the ASEAN Secretariat  
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Table 3 
Indicators of FTA Utilization in Thailand 2008 
 
   Indonesia Malaysia Philippines  Vietnam Australia  Japan 
Number of items applying for ROO certificates 986  1,432  898  1364  1161  1127 
  (per cent of total export item)  18.3  27.4  16.7  26.1  22.2  22.4 
Product concentration  
Cumulative share of top 10 items (per cent)  43.5  38.4  48.1  30.0  62.3  50.9 
Cumulative share of top 20 items (per cent)  55.3  49.9  61.1  44.9  72  62.3 













Coefficient of Variation of FTA  
Utilization rate (per cent)  194  188.3  197.3  171.8 
171.1 203 
 
Note: * Number in the parenthesis is the utilization rate excluding CBU vehicles (HS8701-8704). 
Source: Author compilation from official record of certificate of origin available at Bureau of Trade Preference Development, 
Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce.  International Trade data are from World Trade Atlas database. 
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Table 4 
Variables Description 
Panel A: Data Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Min Max  Nature 
FTA
ii tt    26,754 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7  Time  invariant
, it PC   26,539 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7  2003-08 
, it CON   25,288 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5  1996,  2006 
, it FOR   22,776 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.7  1996,  2006 
, it INT   26,858 7.4 8.2 -6.9  20.8  2003-08 
, it FTAU 25,647 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7  2003-08 
, it BL   26,324 0.9 0.3 0.1 1.8  2000,  2005 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 
FTA
ii tt  , it PC   , it CON , it FOR   , it INT   , it FTAU
, it PC   -0.04  1.00      
, it CON 0.08 -0.07 1.00       
, it FOR   -0.03 0.22 -0.21 1.00     
, it INT   0.12 0.16 -0.06 0.07 1.00   
, it FTAU 0.25 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.37 1.00 
, it BL   0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.10 0.14 0.04 
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Table 5 
Econometric Results with Various Estimation Methods 
  5.1 Pooled Cross-Sectional 5.2 Random-effect  5.3 Fixed-effect  5.4 Random-effect. Tobit 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
Intercept   0.00 -0.39  -0.04*** -3.83 -0.03***  -3.26  -0.03*** -2.73 
FTA
ii tt    0.72*** 32.22  0.65*** 31.76  0.72***  32.22  0.71***  31.95 
, it BL   0.17*** 9.05  0.18*** 9.91  0.17***  9.05  0.17***  9.10 
2
, it BL   -0.10*** -9.78  -0.11*** -10.28  -0.10***  -9.78  -0.10***  -9.81 
, it CON   0.09*** 9.44  0.09*** 9.73  0.09***  9.44  0.09***  9.47 
, it FOR   -0.07*** -9.82  -0.07*** -9.83  -0.07***  -9.82  -0.07***  -9.82 
, it INT   0.01*** 58.07  0.01*** 58.24  0.01***  58.07  0.01***  58.14 
, it PC   -0.03*** -4.82  -0.04*** -4.92  -0.03***  -4.82  -0.04***  -4.83 
Ind  -0.03*** -5.77             
Mal  -0.04*** -7.71             
Phil  -0.03*** -5.5             
Viet  -0.05*** -8.61             
Jap  -0.02*** -2.55             
2 R   0.21   0.203    0.20       
F stat    457.4       767.7       
Log-Likelihood           4184.72   
Wald -
2     5377.6        5350.67   
# obs  21097    21097    21097    21097   
Notes: ***,**, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of statistical significant.  
Source: Author’s Estimation 
    31
Table 6 
Random-Effect Tobit Estimation by Countries 
 
  Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Vietnam
  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
Intercept   -0.02  -0.96 -0.03* -1.57 -0.03*  -1.67 -0.02 -0.22
FTA
ii tt    0.57***  8.91 1.02*** 25.92 0.91***  9.63 0.46*** 13.40
, it BL   0.13***  3.54 0.13*** 3.75 0.13****  3.59 0.09 0.56
2
, it BL   -0.07*** -3.42 -0.08*** -4.00 -0.08***  -3.66 -0.06 -0.86
, it CON   0.07***  3.93 0.12*** 6.56 0.10***  5.82 0.08*** 2.48
, it FOR   -0.07*** -4.40 -0.07*** -4.83 -0.04***  -2.85 -0.05** -2.14
, it INT   0.01***  29.72 0.01*** 20.77 0.01***  28.92 0.01*** 19.91
, it PC   -0.01  -0.81 -0.03*** -2.11 -0.11***  -7.89 -0.01 -0.52
Log-likelihood 1011.5    1096.0   1217.61    325.57  
Wald -
2    1063.4    1639.4   1145.35    688.37  
#obs 4932    4678   4998    2391  
(Cont.) 
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Table 6(Cont.) 
  Australia Japan
  Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat 
Intercept   -0.14* -1.80 -0.05 -0.30
FTA
ii tt    3.22*** 18.98 299.23*** 11.99
, it BL   0.35*** 2.78 0.16 0.62
2
, it BL   -0.19*** -3.77 -0.13* -1.27
, it CON   0.03* 1.31 0.07 1.36
, it FOR   -0.09*** -4.58 -0.08* -2.10
, it INT   0.01*** 20.57 0.01*** 10.81
, it PC   0.06*** 3.30 -0.09** -2.36
Log-likelihood 769.78   150.22  
Wald -
2    1410.62   337.18  
#obs 3291   807  
Notes: ***,**, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of statistical significant.  
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Table 7 
Experimental Runs for Cost of Compiling ROO (Pooled Samples) 
Criterion 1% 2% 3%   4%   5%  
  Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat
Intercept   0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.48 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.74 0.02 0.50
FTA
ii tt    0.35*** 10.88 0.30*** 8.62 0.23*** 5.96 0.20*** 4.80 0.07* 1.30
, it BL   0.15*** 5.66 0.14*** 4.81 0.15*** 4.53 0.12*** 3.14 0.09** 1.87
2
, it BL   -0.09*** -6.06 -0.08*** -5.06 -0.09*** -4.81 -0.07*** -3.17 -0.04* -1.64
, it CON   0.06*** 4.42 0.05*** 4.04 0.06*** 4.18 0.05*** 3.36 0.08*** 3.95
, it FOR   -0.06*** -6.13 -0.06*** -5.72 -0.06*** -5.09 -0.07*** -5.21 -0.05*** -2.84
, it INT   0.01***  50.37 0.01***  48.16 0.02*** 44.43 0.02*** 42.47 0.02*** 33.03 
, it PC   -0.04***  -4.23 -0.02**  -2.29 -0.02**  -2.00  -0.02*  -1.66 -0.01 -0.74 
Log-likelihood 1361.57   1179.82   688.36   577.69   228.18  
Wald -










#obs  13029.   11738   9556   8479   5014  
(cont.) 
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Criterion 6%  7% 8% 9% 10% 11%
  Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat
Intercept   0.04*  1.35 0.05*  1.65 0.05*  1.43 0.05 1.37 0.03 0.60 0.05 1.00
FTA
ii tt    0.05  1.03 0.06 1.07 0.08*  1.42 0.03 0.42 0.06 0.85 0.07 0.94
, it BL   0.02  0.36 -0.05 -0.97 -0.08*  -1.40 -0.05 -0.78 -0.01 -0.19 -0.05 -0.59
2
, it BL   0.00  0.06 0.05*  1.50 0.07*  2.10 0.05*  1.33 0.02 0.48 0.04 0.94
, it CON   0.08***  3.88 0.09*** 4.11 0.08*** 3.67 0.09*** 3.83 0.03 0.87 0.02 0.67
, it FOR   -0.06***  -3.03 -0.04** -2.23 -0.03*  -1.68 -0.04*  -1.73 -0.05*  -1.80 -0.06** -2.02
, it INT   0.02***  32.28 0.02*** 31.04 0.02*** 29.39 0.02**** 28.34 0.02*** 24.07 0.02*** 23.64
, it PC   -0.02  -0.91 -0.01 -0.40 -0.01 -0.35 0.01 0.31 -0.01 -0.56 -0.02 -0.80
Log-likelihood 231.13    193.64   169.00   155.06   53.32   53.87 231.13
Wald -
2   
1118.76    1051.68   964.34   885.23   628.02   615.67  
#obs 4804    4452   4085   3705   2582   2482  
Notes: ***,**, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of statistical significant.  
Source: Author’s Estimation 
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Table 8 
Experimental Runs for Cost of Compiling ROO (Individual Countries) 
 
Indonesia  Greater than 9%  Greater than 10%  Greater than 11% 
 Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat 
Intercept   0.08* 1.62 0.08* 1.39 0.06  0.52 
FTA
ii tt    0.28* 1.76 0.31* 1.80 0.25  1.15 
, it BL   -0.29*** -2.98 -0.22** -2.10 -0.25  -1.06 
2
, it BL   0.22*** 3.85 0.17*** 2.82 0.20  1.42 
, it CON   -0.06* -1.35 -0.01 -0.31 -0.20***  -2.92 
, it FOR   0.01 0.34 -0.04 -0.91 0.03  0.37 
, it INT   0.01*** 13.99 0.01*** 12.62 0.01***  8.51 
, it PC   0.12*** 3.06 0.11** 2.58 0.17** 2.47 
Log-likelihood  164.16  128.06   49.89   
Wald -
2    399.77  263.95  133.18  
#obs  1156   974  526  
          
Malaysia  Greater than 3%  Greater than 4 %  Greater than 5 % 
 Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat 
Intercept   -0.01  -0.19 0.01 0.31 0.03 0.73 
FTA
ii tt    0.25*** 3.36 0.14*  1.70 0.08  0.90 
, it BL   0.15* 1.90 0.13* 1.54 0.09  0.99 
2
, it BL   -0.09** -2.08 -0.08*  -1.71 -0.06  -1.14 
, it CON   0.11* 3.23 0.10** 2.71 0.10** 2.83 
, it FOR   -0.06** -2.03 -0.07** -2.30 -0.07** -2.18 
, it INT   0.02*** 18.02 0.02*** 18.30 0.02*** 18.05 
, it PC   -0.06** -2.05 -0.07** -2.36 -0.06*  -1.95 
Log-likelihood  0.92   -10.87   -9.36  
Wald -
2    365.23  348.38  303.58  
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Table 8(Cont.) 
 
Philippines  Greater than 5%  Greater than 6%  Greater than 7% 
 Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat 
Intercept   0.04  0.69 0.11* 1.66 0.13* 1.54 
FTA
ii tt    0.51* 1.53 0.57* 1.54 -0.04 -0.09 
, it BL   -0.01  -0.10 -0.20* -1.55 -0.20* -1.38 
2
, it BL   0.01  0.13 0.13* 1.66 0.12* 1.41 
, it CON   0.16*** 3.45 0.14*** 3.02 0.18*** 3.41 
, it FOR   -0.17*** -3.44 -0.17*** -3.40 -0.11*  -1.94 
, it INT   0.02*** 14.07 0.02*** 13.02 0.02*** 11.55 
, it PC   0.01  0.28 -0.01 -0.22 -0.03 -0.50 
Log-likelihood  76.11  70.11  48.97  
Wald -
2    252.74  230.03  181.99  
#obs  921  864  721  
          
Vietnam  Greater than 3%  Greater than 4%  Greater than 5% 
 Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat 
Intercept   -0.05 -0.35 -0.08 -0.53 -0.32*  -1.42 
FTA
ii tt    0.17**  2.85 0.15 2.39 0.03 0.43 
, it BL   0.16 0.70 0.23 0.94 0.63*  1.77 
2
, it BL   -0.10 -1.08 -0.12 -1.28 -0.27**  -1.97 
, it CON   0.04 0.86 0.04 0.79 0.06*  1.32 
, it FOR   -0.02 -0.50 -0.03 -0.85 -0.02 -0.62 
, it INT   0.02*** 18.62 0.02*** 18.33 0.02*** 17.87 
, it PC   -0.07* -2.03 -0.07**  -2.13 -0.09**  -2.43 
Log-likelihood  45.78  43.91  36.58  
Wald -
2    371.43  363.42  336.36  
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Table 8(Cont.) 
 
Australia  Greater than 1%  Greater than 2%  Greater than 3% 
 Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat Coefficient  Z-stat 
Intercept   -0.16  -0.99 -0.29* -1.64 -0.26* -1.27 
FTA
ii tt    2.76*** 6.25 1.93*** 3.48 0.16  0.18 
, it BL   0.32 1.22 0.63**  2.17 0.73**  2.19 
2
, it BL   -0.19* -1.85 -0.35**  -2.94 -0.40***  -2.92 
, it CON   0.02 0.55 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.25 
, it FOR   -0.13*** -4.14 -0.13*** -4.09 -0.16*** -4.34 
, it INT   0.02*** 21.25 0.02*** 21.39 0.02*** 19.98 
, it PC   0.09*** 3.13 0.11*** 3.49 0.16*** 4.57 
Log-likelihood 83.64    43.08 31.68  
Wald -
2    584.72  471.50  390.23  
#obs  1856   1382   1149  
 
Notes: ***,**, and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of statistical significant.  
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